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ENFORCING PUBLIC TAKEOVER REGULATION 
Reconciling Public and Private Interests* 
Takeover regulation in the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore 
relies on takeover codes and takeover panels. However, 
parties aggrieved by the decisions of the panels may 
sometimes challenge them in the courts, giving rise to the 
potential of overlapping jurisdictions. The problem is 
compounded by two factors: the enforcement of the takeover 
codes can have substantive implications on the parties’ ability 
to enforce their rights in courts, and takeover panels and 
courts assess matters differently. This article argues that there 
needs to be a clearer delineation between the potentially 
overlapping jurisdictions of the takeover panels and the 
courts. 
WAN Wai Yee 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
BCL (Oxford); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Solicitor (England and Wales); Attorney and  
Counsellor-at-law (New York);  
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction
1 In the UK, public takeovers are primarily regulated by the City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers1 (“UK Code”) and the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers (“UK Panel”). The UK Code represents the
collective opinion of those professionally involved in takeovers as to
how takeovers should be regulated. The UK Panel, which is a specialist
independent body comprising representatives from the financial and
investment community, enforces the UK Code. Other common law
jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific have closely followed the UK approach
to takeover regulation with some minor variations, including
Hong Kong2 and Singapore.3
* This research was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (“MOE”)
Academic Research Fund Tier 1 grant with the MOE’s official grant number
17-C234-SMU-002. I thank Umakanth Varottil and the anonymous referee for
providing comments on earlier drafts of this article and Emma Armson for the
discussions relating to the Australian takeover regulation.
1 12th Ed, 2016. 
2 The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018). See 
generally David Donald, “Evolutionary Development in Hong Kong of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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2 However, while the takeover panel is the main forum for 
resolving disputes in these takeover code jurisdictions, it is not the only 
forum. Aggrieved parties may wish to challenge the decision of the 
panel. Further, takeover disputes often involve substantive legal rights of 
the market participants, which are ordinarily resolved in the courts. The 
question that often arises is the role of courts vis-à-vis the takeover 
panels in the jurisdictions that adopt the takeover code. Existing 
scholarship4 and established case law5 have considered two situations of 
potential conflict: where market participants seek to challenge the 
takeover panel’s rulings in judicial review proceedings, or where the 
target (or its board) seeks to pre-empt the takeover panel through 
tactical litigation in an attempt to enjoin a hostile takeover bid.6 In the 
case of the former, it is clear that the courts can review decisions of 
takeover panels, albeit the scope of the review is somewhat limited. In 
the case of the latter, it is well established that the prohibition on the 
frustration of bona fide bids in the takeover codes can limit the ability of 
target boards to fulfil their fiduciary duties. 
3 Outside of judicial review and tactical litigation, the traditional 
resolution to the issue of potential overlap in jurisdictions is that the 
court only adjudicates on the substantive legal rights of the participants. 
The takeover panel determines whether the participants have complied 
with the takeover code and, in appropriate cases, makes remedial orders 
to rectify such non-compliance.7 However, takeovers occur against the 
backdrop of legal relationships among the shareholders, directors, the 
bidder and the target,8 and the line drawn between adjudication on 
                                                                                                                               
Transplanted UK-Origin Takeover Rules” in Comparative Takeover Regulation: 
Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 12. 
3 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019). See 
generally Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style of Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in 
Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth 
Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 13. 
4 Eg, David Kershaw, Principles of Takeover Regulation (Oxford University Press, 
2016) ch 3. See paras 9–25 below. 
5 See paras 9–25 below. 
6 John Armour & David Skeel, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and 
Why? The Peculiar Diverge of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Geo 
LJ 1727; Dan Awrey, Blanaid Clarke & Sean J Griffith, “Resolving the Crisis in 
US Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation 
Machine” (2018) 35 Yale J on Reg 1. 
7 The distinction between the role of the courts and the takeover panels can be 
found, for example, in the UK case of R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte 
Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146. See para 22 below. 
8 See Takis Tridimas, “Self-Regulation and Investor Protection in the United 
Kingdom: The Takeover Panel and the Market for Corporate Control” (1991) 
10 CJQ 24; Peter Cane, “Self-Regulation and Judicial Review” (1987) 6 CJQ 324. 
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compliance of the takeover code and substantive legal obligations is 
rarely well defined. 
4 Drawing from more recent examples of takeover disputes in the 
UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, this article argues that that the potential 
for conflicting outcomes, due to the overlap in jurisdictions, has 
assumed much more importance. This potential for conflict has 
intensified, largely in part due to the fact that takeover panels place far 
more emphasis on market certainty and facilitating orderliness in the 
markets since the market turmoil after the 2001 terrorist attacks and 
2008 global financial crisis. Additionally, given that some of these 
matters are effectively disposed at proceedings before the takeover panel 
(and are thus moot issues by the time that they are litigated), they raise 
the question of whether the takeover panel is intended to be the main 
(or even only) forum for disputes during the bidding process. In other 
words, is it desirable to effectively foreclose the right of the market 
participants to bring an action, ex post the takeover? 
5 This article argues that there is insufficient basis to foreclose the 
right of the market participants to bring substantive legal actions in the 
courts. Yet, at the same time, moving to a system where takeover 
regulation is largely decided by the courts will undermine most of the 
advantages of speed and certainty that are currently found in the 
takeover code jurisdictions. One possible solution to address this 
problem is to have a clearer delineation of the powers of the courts and 
the takeover panels. It considers the suitability of importing the partial 
solution in Australia in the form of s 659B-C of the Corporations Act 
2001, which makes the Australian Takeovers Panel (“Australian Panel”) 
the only forum for solving disputes when the bid is under way. While 
there are important differences between the Australian Panel and the 
takeover panels in the takeover code jurisdictions,9 the functions of the 
Australian Panel parallel that of the panels in the takeover code 
jurisdictions as they seek to settle disputes in takeovers and make their 
decisions on similar aims and principles. 
                                                          
9 For example, the Australian Takeovers Panel (“Australian Panel”) is not able to act 
of its own volition but decides applications that are brought before it. Also, in view 
of the constitutional position in Australia, it is not possible for the Australian Panel 
to determine the legal rights of the parties. See chapter 3 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution. See generally Emma Armson, “The Australian Takeovers Panel and 
Judicial Review of Its Decisions” (2005) 26 Adelaide Law Review 327; Rodd Levy, 
Takeovers Law and Strategy (Thomson Reuters, 4th Ed, 2012); The Takeover Panel 
and Takeovers Regulation in Australia (Ian Ramsay ed) (Melbourne University 
Press, 2010). 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
6 The article is organised as follows. Part II10 sets out the 
respective roles of the courts and the takeover panels in takeover code 
jurisdictions. Part III11 deals with the circumstances in which the 
takeover panels resolve disputes to give effect to certainty and market 
orderliness, even though the principles-based approach in the takeover 
codes may conflict or be inconsistent with the conclusion reached under 
private law. Part III then discusses the following: first, where there is a 
conflict, will the court give primacy to the decisions of the takeover 
panel? Second, as a matter of process, is a party precluded from bringing 
litigation in the courts to seek redress arising from the decision of the 
takeover panel on the grounds of such inconsistency? 
7 Part IV12 argues that while the takeover panel is not necessarily 
concerned with the legal position of the participants in the takeover, the 
remedial order or failure to grant relief in respect of contravention of the 
takeover code will often affect the participant’s remedies at private law. 
8 Part V13 sets out the observations and analyses the implications 
of the findings on recent developments. In particular, it discusses 
whether the reluctance of the courts to intervene in decisions made by 
specialist takeover panels, which are driven by concerns of market 
certainty and predictability rather than giving effect to substantive legal 
rights, continues to be justifiable in light of the increasing impact on 
private law. It also argues for the desirability of a clearer delineation 
between the takeover panel and the courts and assesses the viability of 
the Australian example. Part VI14 concludes. 
II. Background and the problem of overlapping jurisdictions 
9 There are significant similarities between the takeover 
regulations in the UK (post-2006) and its former colonies (such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong), which have transplanted the UK-style of 
takeover regulation. Prior to the implementation of the European Union 
(“EU”) Takeover Directive (“Takeover Directive”) in 2006,15 the UK 
Panel was an entirely self-regulatory body and did not have statutory 
enforcement powers.16 Post-2006, while the UK Panel now possesses a 
                                                          
10 See paras 9–25 below. 
11 See paras 26–45 below. 
12 See paras 46–53 below. 
13 See paras 54–67 below. 
14 See paras 68–69 below. 
15 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on takeover bids. 
16 Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) ss 942–992. It is noted that even after the 
implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, the underlying self-regulatory nature of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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statutory function, the essential characteristic of the UK Panel as a 
regulator of takeovers remains unchanged.17 Decisions of the UK Panel 
are made by the Takeover Executive, and rulings can be reviewed by the 
Hearings Committee18 with a right to appeal to the Takeover Appeal 
Board.19 Panel members are drawn from finance and investment 
communities.20 The UK Panel can order compensation for breaches of 
specified provisions of the UK Code,21 and its rulings can now be 
enforced by the courts.22 
10 Similarly, in Singapore and Hong Kong, takeover regulation is 
primarily regulated under the Singapore Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers23 (“Singapore Code”) and the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers 
and Share Buybacks24 (“HK Code”) respectively, both of which are based 
on the UK Code. In Singapore, the Singapore Code is administered by 
the Securities Industry Council of Singapore (“SIC”), established under 
the Securities and Futures Act.25 Unlike in the UK, however, SIC 
members not only are drawn from the private sector but also include 
government representatives, though the majority are from the private 
sector.26 While day-to-day decisions are generally made by the 
secretariat of the SIC, the SIC may convene hearing committees in 
certain significant cases.27 Unlike in the UK and Hong Kong, the 
Singapore Code does not provide for a right of further appeal against 
SIC decisions. In Hong Kong, the HK Code is administered by the 
Takeovers and Mergers Panel (“HK Panel”).28 Rulings at first instance 
                                                                                                                               
the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers has not changed. See Jonathan Mukwiri, 
“The Myth of Tactical Litigation in UK Takeovers” (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 373. 
17 See also Geoffrey Morse, “Regulating Takeovers: The Regulators and the Courts: 
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes” (2007) 22 NZULR 622. 
18 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) Introduction, “The 
Panel and its Committees”. 
19 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) Introduction, “The 
Panel and its Committees”. 
20 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) Introduction, “The 
Panel and its Committees”. 
21 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) Introduction, 
“Enforcing the Code”. 
22 See s 955 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (c 46). For a recent case on s 955, see The 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers v David King [2017] CSOH 156 at para 15 below. 
23 Revised 24 January 2019. 
24 July 2018. 
25 Cap 289, 2006 Rev ed. 
26 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) 
Introduction. 
27 Eg, Re Jade Technologies Grounds of Decision of the Hearing Committee appointed 
by the Securities Council, In the matter of Jade Technologies Holdings Ltd 
(14 October 2008). See para 47 below. 
28 When the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) was 
first set up, it was administered by the Committee on Takeovers and Mergers, 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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are made by the Executive of the HK Panel, and it is possible to appeal 
the decisions to the HK Panel and to further appeal to the Takeover 
Appeal Committee. The HK Panel, established under the Securities and 
Futures Commission of Hong Kong, comprises members from the 
financial and investment community.29 
11 All three takeover code jurisdictions provide for the takeover 
panel the power to order compensation for breaches of the takeover 
code, though there are some variations on the scope of compensation. 
For example, the Singapore Code, unlike the UK and HK codes,30 does 
not exhaustively define the types of breaches which compensation may 
be awarded for.31 
12 Existing scholarship and jurisprudence deal with two areas of 
overlap between the takeover panels and the courts where there may be 
conflicting decisions reached by both bodies. The first relates to judicial 
review proceedings and the second to litigation by target boards to 
enjoin bona fide bids. There is a third area of potential conflict: pursuant 
to s 955 of the UK Companies Act 2006,32 if the UK Panel applies to the 
court to enforce compliance with the UK Code. However, as this 
provision is found in neither the Singapore nor HK code, and is unlikely 
to prove contentious in UK practice in light of The Panel of Takeovers 
and Mergers v David King,33 it has been excluded from discussion in this 
article. 
A. Judicial review 
13 In the UK, before the UK Panel was put on a statutory footing,34 
the English Court of Appeal in R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers plc, 
                                                                                                                               
which included three members from the (then) Securities Commission and 
six members from the financial community. 
29 Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) (Hong Kong) s 8. See the Codes on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) Introduction. 
30 The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) 
(Hong Kong) rule 13.13. See Hong Kong, Securities and Futures Commission, 
“Consultation Conclusions on Proposed Amendments to the Codes on Takeovers 
and Mergers and Share Buybacks” (13 July 2018). 
31 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) 
Introduction, “Enforcement of the Code”. 
32 c 46. 
33 [2017] CSOH 156. See para 15 below. 
34 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) and the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers were put on a statutory footing, pursuant to the 
implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids via the Takeovers Directive (Interim 
Implementation) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1183). 
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ex parte Datafin plc35 (“ex parte Datafin”) held that decisions of the 
UK Panel were subject to judicial review, on the application of either the 
“nature” test36 or the “source” test in administrative law.37 However, the 
scope for challenging a UK Panel ruling was very narrow; the courts 
generally refused to intervene in UK Panel rulings, particularly when 
they were made in the course of a takeover offer. There was thus very 
little scope for any party to engage in any kind of tactical litigation to 
enjoin a hostile takeover bid. Furthermore, unless the UK Panel had 
breached any rule of natural justice, any ruling by the courts would 
generally operate prospectively (that is, declaring what the proper 
decision of the UK Panel should have been for future guidance) and to 
exonerate individuals disciplined. This was because the courts 
considered the interests of market certainty, given that the market 
proceeded and traded on the assumption that the UK Panel’s rules and 
decisions were valid. 
14 In a subsequent case, Grand Metropolitan attempted in its bid 
for Irish Distillers Group to challenge the UK Panel’s refusal38 to relieve 
the shareholders, who had given irrevocable undertakings, from the 
obligation to accept Pernod’s offer. It ultimately withdrew the 
application when the court refused its expedited application to ensure 
that the review took place before the close of the rival bid.39 Citing 
ex parte Datafin, the court made it clear that such proceedings were not 
intended to reverse the UK Panel’s rulings made in the takeovers.40 
                                                          
35 [1987] 1 QB 815. 
36 See R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 
at 826, per Sir John Donaldson MR, which stated of the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers: 
Lacking any authority de jure, it exercises immense power de facto by 
devising, promulgating, amending and interpreting the UK Code on 
Take-overs and Mergers, by waiving or modifying the application of the code 
in particular circumstances, by investigating and reporting upon alleged 
breaches of the code and by the application or threat of sanctions. These 
sanctions are no less effective because they are applied indirectly and lack a 
legally enforceable base. 
37 See R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815, 
holding that applying the “nature” test, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers was 
subject to judicial review but even if the “source” test was the sole test, the panel 
was established “under authority of the Government” (at 849) and was thus subject 
to judicial review. 
38 Irish Distillers Group plc PS 1988/25 (17 November 1988). 
39 “Grand Met Withdraws Review Call” The Times (24 November 1988); “Grand Met 
Beaten by Pernod in IDG Battle” The Independent (24 November 1988). See also 
Tony Shea, “Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom” (1990) 16 Brooklyn 
J In’tl L 89. 
40 See Irish Distillers Group plc PS 1988/28 (23 November 1988). See also Mark 
Warham, “The Takeover Panel” in A Practitioner’s Guide to the UK Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers 2006/2007 (Maurice Button ed) (City & Financial 
Publishing, 2006) 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
15 Further, even in cases where the matter is no longer 
time-sensitive or the takeover has been completed, the English courts 
have still been unwilling to intervene in UK Panel decisions.41 The 
importance of not undermining the public confidence in the manner in 
which the UK Panel operates was again underlined in The Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers v David King,42 a decision that was decided after 
the UK Panel was put on a statutory footing.43 That case was not a 
judicial review but concerned the interpretation of s 955 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006,44 where the UK Panel sought an order from the 
court to compel K to make a mandatory bid on the grounds that he was 
a member of a concert party group that had acquired shares in the 
target, and their combined acquisitions had crossed the mandatory bid 
threshold. K argued that he was impecunious and the order would have 
been futile, since the mandatory offer price was at the material time 
below the trading price. In granting the order, the court emphasised that 
it would be contrary to public interest if it acted in a way that 
undermined the UK Panel from policing takeovers.45 In making its 
decision, the court reviewed the findings of the UK Panel and the 
Takeover Appeal Committee and concluded that K had had control over 
the bidder’s resources. 
16 In Hong Kong, it is settled law that decisions of the takeover 
panel are subject to judicial review.46 The High Court recently held that 
where the HK Code conflicts with legislation, legislation will always take 
priority.47 
17 In Singapore, while the courts have yet to rule definitively on 
the matter, scholars have argued that the decisions of SIC should be 
subject to judicial review even though the Singapore Code is not 
                                                          
41 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146. R v 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCLC 938. 
42 [2017] CSOH 156. 
43 An appeal by David King was dismissed: Panel on Takeovers and Mergers v David 
King [2018] CSIH 30. 
44 This provision was not present in R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte 
Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815. 
45 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers v David King [2017] CSOH 156 at [99]. The 
court also stressed the two-stage appeal structure in the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers comprising the Hearings Committee and Takeovers Appeal Board, both 
of which are independent from the Panel Executive. 
46 Re Television Broadcasts Ltd HCAL 250/2017 (10 May 2017); In the matter of 
judicial review by the applicant A under Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of the High 
Court HCAL 29/2014 (7 November 2014) (application for judicial review 
succeeded). See also Amoy Properties v Committee on Takeovers and Mergers and 
Commissioner for Securities [1989] 1 HKC 1. 
47 Re Television Broadcasts Ltd HCAL 250/2017 (10 May 2017). 
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subsidiary legislation48 since the decision-making powers of SIC were 
derived from the Securities and Futures Act.49 Alternatively, it has been 
suggested that, on the application of the “nature” test and ex parte 
Datafin, the decisions of SIC are subject to judicial review as SIC 
exercises an important public duty, being able to sanction wrongdoers 
and its power neither depending on contract nor being consensual.50 
B. Target boards enjoining takeover bids through litigation 
18 The second area of overlap is where the target boards bring 
actions to enjoin hostile takeover bids in the absence of independent 
shareholder approval. In 1980, in charting the history of the UK Code, 
Sir Andrew Johnston documented the concerns (then) by UK city 
solicitors that the UK Code might be inconsistent with general 
obligations under company law.51 Specifically, the concerns related to 
differences in how the UK Panel and the court would assess the target 
board’s actions. The UK Panel assessed the board’s actions based on 
their objective effect, while the courts assessed the propriety of the 
board’s actions based on whether the board had in fact exercised the 
decision for a proper purpose, which included an element of 
subjectivity. The response to the conflict then was that the UK Code was 
intended to restrict the actions of the boards of the target and the 
bidder. Sir Andrew argued that while there were several situations in the 
1970s where there were potential conflicts between the UK Code and 
the rulings of the courts relating to target boards bringing actions to 
enjoin bids, there was no judicial ruling nullifying the operation of the 
UK Code.52 
                                                          
48 Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) s 139(3). See also Hans Tjio, 
Principles and Practice of Securities Regulation in Singapore (Singapore: LexisNexis, 
2nd Ed, 2011) at p 115. 
49 See Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style of Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in 
Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth 
Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
50 Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style of Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in Comparative 
Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee 
Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
51 See Alexander Johnston, The City Take-over Code (Oxford University Press, 1980). 
52 See Alexander Johnston, The City Take-over Code (Oxford University Press, 1980). 
It was also reported that the ruling of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
(“UK Panel”) is in direct conflict with the legal or equitable rights of third parties 
not involved in the takeover. See Geoffrey Morse, “Controlling Takeovers – The 
Self-regulation Option in the United Kingdom” [1998] JBL 58 (referring to the 
1995 decision of the UK Panel in respect of British Land Company’s (“British 
Land’s”) offer for Stanhope Properties, which owned 50% of a dead-locked joint 
venture company, Broadgate Properties. The other joint venturer of Broadgate 
Properties, R, argued that British Land should offer for all of the remaining shares 
of Broadgate Properties on the basis of the chain principle. By ruling that there was 
no obligation to make an offer for the remaining shares, the UK Panel could 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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19 The acquisition of Consolidated Gold Fields plc (“Consgold”) 
demonstrated the UK Panel’s position that the no-frustration rule in the 
UK Code should trump the analysis of directors’ duties at general law. In 
April 1989, Minorco announced that it held or had acceptances in 
respect of 54.8% of Consgold but was not able to declare the offer 
unconditional; Consgold, Gold Fields Mining Corporation (Consgold’s 
wholly owned subsidiary), Newmont Mining Corporation (“Newmont”) 
(49% owned by Consgold) and a subsidiary of Newmont had obtained 
interim injunctions in the District Court in New York which prevented 
Minorco from acquiring control of Consgold. Consgold argued that the 
initiation and the continuance of the litigation were in compliance with 
their directors’ duties to protect the interests of their company, and the 
failure to continue the proceedings would expose them to legal action by 
minority shareholders. However, the UK Panel held that the litigation 
could amount to a frustrating action which required the approval of the 
shareholders and thus ruled that actions taken by directors in fulfilment 
of their duties could be limited by the UK Code. The UK Panel 
emphasised that in considering their views of the best interests of the 
company, directors must have regard to the UK Code and the rulings of 
the UK Panel.53 
20 While there is no similar case law or panel decision in Singapore 
and Hong Kong, a similar position is likely to be adopted given that the 
no-frustration rule is found in the Singapore Code and HK Code 
respectively.54 
C. Other areas of overlap in jurisdictions 
21 However, outside of these two areas of judicial review and target 
boards attempting to enjoin hostile takeover offers in the courts, is it 
possible for the courts and the takeover panels to reach inconsistent 
outcomes? Historically, this has not been a problematic issue. In private 
litigation, the UK courts have generally deferred to the UK Code and 
the UK Panel; the courts have referred to the UK Code as a guide to 
good practice in takeovers, even in situations that are not governed by 
the UK Code.55 The courts have made pronouncements which support 
the relevance of the standard of conduct set out in the UK Code, even in 
                                                                                                                               
potentially abrogate the rights of R, who may have fiduciary duties owed by 
Stanhope (which is now controlled by British Land). 
53 Consolidated Gold Fields plc PS 1989/7 (9 May 1989) at 13. 
54 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) General 
Principle 7; the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) 
rule 4. 
55 Eg, Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamonds Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 222. See generally 
Geoffrey Morse, “Regulating Takeovers: The Regulators and the Courts – Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes” (2007) 22 NZULR 622. 
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cases where the UK Code does not directly apply.56 In Hong Kong, in 
judicial decisions that involve consideration of compliance with the 
HK Code, the courts have rendered judgments not only on the literal 
wording of the HK Code but with an emphasis on the principles on 
which the HK Code was founded.57 
22 In other situations, the overlap in jurisdictions is resolved by 
acknowledging that the aims of the panels and courts are different; 
takeover panels enforce only the takeover codes and not the substantive 
rights of the parties, which are in the purview of the courts. 
For example, when takeover panels order compensation, such 
compensation is confined only to losses arising from breaches of the 
takeover code and not extended to other claims. In The Distillers Co 
plc,58 a decision of the UK Panel in connection with Guinness’s takeover 
of Distillers, Guinness was ordered to compensate Distillers’ 
shareholders who should have received, pursuant to rule 11 of the 
UK Code (as it then applied), an improved cash offer from Guinness but 
did not. Guinness wanted to make it a precondition to the payment of 
compensation that the former Distillers shareholders execute a legal 
release of any claims they might have had against Guinness in respect of 
the takeover. The UK Panel ruled that while Guinness was entitled to 
require shareholders to give a release for claims arising out of the 
absence of a higher cash offer as a result of the breach, shareholders 
should not be required to forgo any claims in respect of other losses 
arising out of other breaches of the UK Code or of law. 
23 However, in the context of private disputes, while the aims of 
the takeover panels and the courts are different in theory, the issue of 
overlapping jurisdictions is now more pronounced for the following 
reasons. First, in the UK, Kershaw argues that when the UK Panel and 
the UK Code moved to a statutory footing after 2006, the courts, when 
interpreting legislation implementing the Takeover Directive, should 
take a purposive approach to interpretation that complies with the 
Takeover Directive.59 For example, while the UK Panel does not 
determine issues of company law, Kershaw argues that it is nevertheless 
required to interpret the UK Code in a manner that gives effect to the 
                                                          
56 See Geoffrey Morse, “Regulating Takeovers: The Regulators and the Courts – Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes” (2007) 22 NZULR 622 (providing examples such as 
standards of conduct in a private takeover in Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1991] 
BCC 736 and amending the terms of a squeeze-out notice (Fiske Nominees v 
Dwyka Diamonds Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 222). 
57 See HKSAR v Habibullah Abdul Rahman cacc 302/2008 at [277]. 
58 PS 1989/13 (14 July 1989). 
59 David Kershaw, Principles of Takeover Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
at paras 4.63–4.69. 
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EU Takeover Directive, and company law concepts may ultimately be 
relevant to the determination of its rulings.60 
24 Second, and relevant not only to the UK but also to the other 
takeover code jurisdictions, takeover panels are guided by maintenance 
of three core principles: that the takeover operates in an orderly takeover 
market, that shareholders are treated equally and that shareholders are 
the ultimate decision-makers on the outcome of the bids.61 In relation to 
the first core principle, certainty and predictability in the market take 
precedence. In contrast, the courts determine the substantive legal rights 
of the parties that appear before them, though they do take into account 
public interest in ensuring that takeovers rulings are given effect to. As 
such, the decisions reached by both bodies may provide conflicting 
results. Drawing examples from takeovers in the UK, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, this author finds that notwithstanding the fact that takeover 
panels do not directly adjudicate on the existing rights of the private 
parties or make pronouncements on private law, the outcomes of their 
decisions do have an impact, either by affecting the substantive existing 
rights of the parties or by impeding the parties’ enforcement of their 
legal rights in the courts. 
25 The author highlights two issues that have arisen in the last two 
decades in the three takeover code jurisdictions. First, by purportedly 
enforcing the principles and rules of the takeover codes to ensure an 
orderly market, the takeover panels may reach decisions that are 
inconsistent with the bidder board’s fiduciary duties and/or restricted 
the ability of the bidders’ contractual ability to terminate offers. Second, 
the remedial order of the takeover panel or failure to grant relief in 
respect of contravention of the takeover code thereof will often directly 
affect the market participants’ remedies at private law, even ex post the 
takeover. In both cases, the takeover regulator is influenced by the need 
to take into account the public interests in ensuring an orderly market. 
                                                          
60 David Kershaw, Principles of Takeover Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
at paras 4.63–4.69. 
61 Introduction to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) provides 
that: 
The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders in an offeree 
company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the 
merits of a takeover and that shareholders in the offeree company of the same 
class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror. The Code also provides 
an orderly framework within which takeovers are conducted. In addition, it is 
designed to promote, in conjunction with other regulatory regimes, the 
integrity of the financial markets. 
 For similar provisions in Hong Kong, see The Hong Kong Codes on Takeovers and 
Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) Introduction at para 1.2 and Singapore 
Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) General Principles 1, 3 
and 12. 
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Such influence is not present to the same degree if the matters are 
decided by the courts. 
III. Potential conflicts between takeover regulation and 
substantive rights of parties under private law 
26 Takeover panels are concerned with ensuring an orderly market 
where takeovers operate.62 In fact, the UK and Singapore codes63 
historically evolved to deal with the problems that may arise in a 
laissez faire market due to inadequacy and lack of control in supervising 
takeovers. However, in recent times, there has been greater emphasis by 
current takeover panels on market certainty and facilitating orderliness 
in the market due to the fact that the markets have been far less stable 
after the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis.64 This 
policy has translated to the takeover panels having a stronger interest in 
ensuring that offers which have been announced should be completed, 
unless defeated only on regulatory grounds or failure to fulfil the 
acceptance condition. 
27 In particular, there are two situations where the takeover 
regulator has focused primarily on market certainty and predictability, 
resulting in a potential conflict in respect of fiduciary law obligations of 
bidder directors under company law and the takeover code, and in 
respect of obligations of the parties under company law and contract 
law. 
A. Conflict between company law and takeover code 
28 Where there is a conflict between the target board duties under 
the takeover codes in respect of the no-frustration rule and the duties at 
common law (including equitable principles), the target board is obliged 
to give precedence to the takeover code.65 However, the position relating 
to bidder boards is more complex. 
                                                          
62 Introduction to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) provides 
that: 
The Code also provides an orderly framework within which takeovers are 
conducted. In addition, it is designed to promote, in conjunction with other 
regulatory regimes, the integrity of the financial markets. 
63 See Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in Comparative 
Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee 
Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 13. 
64 See Wai Yee Wan, “Invoking Protective Conditions to Terminate Public Mergers 
and Acquisitions Transactions” [2011] JBL 64. 
65 See Consolidated Gold Fields plc PS 1989/7 (9 May 1989) at para 19 above. In 
Singapore, a director of the Singapore-incorporated company is under a duty to act 
in the best interests of the company, both at common law and under s 157 of the 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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29 In general, the takeover code jurisdictions regard the 
relationship between the bidder board and its own shareholders as being 
regulated by company law (which will be the law of incorporation of the 
bidder), and which the takeover panel does not intervene. For example, 
in UK, a response paper of the UK Panel post-Kraft/Cadbury66 takeover 
states that any regulation of the relationship between the bidder board 
and its shareholders by the UK Panel would be a “new area of 
regulation”.67 
30 However, what if the bidder board, in purported compliance of 
its fiduciary obligations, acts in a manner that may undermine certainty 
and predictability in the market? For instance, if a bidder board no 
longer wishes to proceed with an announced offer because it no longer 
believes that it is in its interests to do so,68 and the transaction requires 
the approval of the bidder shareholders,69 can the bidder lapse the offer 
by refusing to hold the shareholders’ meeting? If the meeting is in fact 
held, can the bidder board urge its shareholders to vote against the 
acquisition? 
31 Under the takeover codes in the three jurisdictions, the position 
is unclear as to whether the bidder board can effectively frustrate its 
own offer by refusing to hold a meeting. In the UK, the Code 
Committee of the Panel (which has rule-making functions) held that, 
while the board of the bidder is not obliged to recommend to its 
shareholders to vote for the transaction in all circumstances, 
                                                                                                                               
Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed). Section 159 of the Companies Act expressly 
provides that directors of a Singapore-incorporated company are entitled to have 
regard to the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 
2019) and the rulings of the Securities Industry Council of Singapore in exercising 
their powers. 
66 For the Kraft/Cadbury takeover, see generally Blanaid Clarke, “Reviewing 
Takeover Regulation in the Wake of the Cadbury Acquisition – Regulation in a 
Twirl” [2011] JBL 298. 
67 See United Kingdom, Code Committee of the Takeover Panel, Response Statement 
to the Consultation Paper on Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of 
Takeover Bids (RS 2010/22, 21 October 2010) at para 4.8. 
68 For example, in a high-profile case, Prudential plc (“Prudential”) announced that it 
would acquire American International Assurance (“AIA”) in 2010. However, after 
the announcement, it became clear that there was significant shareholder 
opposition, and Prudential sought a reduced sale price. When the reduction was 
not forthcoming, Prudential chose to terminate the transaction and paid the break 
fee. The costs of the termination (including the break fee) were lower than the 
reduction in the sale price that Prudential was seeking. See Steven Solomon, “The 
Takeaway from the Failed AIA Deal” Dealbook, The New York Times (2 June 
2010). 
69 The transaction could require the bidder shareholders’ approval under a number 
of circumstances, such as the issuance of shares, or is a significant transaction 
under the relevant listing rules applicable to the bidder. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 Enforcing Public Takeover Regulation:  
 Reconciling Public and Private Interests  
 
a recommendation to shareholders to vote down the transaction is 
regarded as a serious matter, and the bidder and advisers have to do all 
that is possible to avoid such a situation arising or risk being found to be 
in breach of their duty of care.70 The actions required of the bidder 
board include, prior to announcing the offer, taking all reasonable steps 
to satisfy themselves that they can still recommend the offer if the offer 
is subject to the consent of the bidder shareholders. 
32 If the approach of the UK Code Committee is adopted in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, it is likely that takeover panels will still 
require the bidder board to call for its own shareholders’ meeting and 
the decision whether to proceed would be made by its shareholders. 
Since the board owes fiduciary duties to the company, the board must, 
in discharging these duties, consider whether it is in the interests of the 
shareholders to vote in favour of the transaction. Thus, while it is 
unlikely that takeover panels will compel the bidder board to 
recommend that its shareholders vote in favour of the transaction if the 
board believes otherwise, the bidder board may still face other 
consequences: it could potentially still be held by the takeover panel to 
be in breach of its duty of care under the takeover code. 
33 In the earlier work, this author documents the actual case in the 
Singapore takeover offer by Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc (“M-Flex”) 
for MFS Technology Ltd (“MFS”) where there was a conflict between the 
duties of the bidder board under company law and under the takeover 
code. The bidder, M-Flex, a Delaware company,71 made a preconditional 
offer to acquire MFS, a Singapore company, and the offer was governed 
by the Singapore Code. After the announcement, the target announced 
disappointing results, and the M-Flex board believed that the target was 
not as profitable as it thought it was; the board thus withdrew its 
recommendation for the offer. However, the SIC refused to allow M-Flex 
to terminate the offer, and M-Flex proceeded to sue, among others, MFS 
in Delaware, arguing that it was inconsistent with its fiduciary duties to 
proceed with the offer. The matter was eventually settled without firm 
conclusion on this point, but it is a reminder of the difficulties that the 
bidder board may face in a conflict between its fiduciary duties and the 
takeover code. 
                                                          
70 United Kingdom, Code Committee of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 
Consultation Paper Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel: Conditions and 
Pre-conditions (PCP 2004/4, 10 August 2004) at para 8.4, quoting Budgens plc 
PS 1989/14 (1 August 1989). 
71 Section 159 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) does not apply to Multi-
Fineline Electronix, Inc, which is a foreign corporation. 
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B. Conflict between the takeover code and contract law 
34 Waivable or protective conditions constitute some of the most 
difficult areas in takeover regulation, as they illustrate the tension 
between allowing the parties the freedom in setting the commercial 
terms of the takeover and ensuring market certainty. These are 
conditions which are capable of being waived and principally comprise 
negotiated or bespoke conditions (specifying the circumstances under 
which a party can terminate the offer or agreement), or generally 
worded material adverse change (MAC) clauses. Negotiated or bespoke 
conditions are not uncommon in takeover offers of publicly listed 
companies in the UK, Singapore and Hong Kong.72 
35 The takeover codes in the UK, Singapore and Hong Kong reach 
the balance on negotiated or bespoke conditions in the following ways. 
First, conditions relating to financing are severely limited or 
prohibited.73 Second, bidder protection conditions (that are waivable) 
cannot depend on the judgment of the bidder (as it would amount to 
giving the bidder the ability to refuse to proceed with the offer).74 In the 
UK and Hong Kong, additionally, offeree protection conditions cannot 
depend on the judgment of the target.75 Singapore allows for negotiated 
                                                          
72 See generally Wai Yee Wan, “Invoking Protective Conditions to Terminate Public 
Mergers and Acquisitions Transactions” [2011] JBL 64 (for UK), Wai Yee Wan, 
“UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in Comparative Takeover Regulation: 
Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 13 (for Singapore) and para 38 below for 
Hong Kong. For negotiated or bespoke conditions, see generally United Kingdom, 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Conditions and Pre-Conditions: Statement by 
the Code Committee of the Panel Following External Consultation Process of PCP 
2004/4 (RS 2004/4, 25 April 2005) (which rejected the view that bespoke or 
negotiated conditions should be treated differently from widely standard drafted 
conditions). For recent examples of bespoke conditions in the UK, see Ricardo 
Silva and Marco Auletto’s offer for Electric Word plc, announced on 27 June 2017, 
and Hailiang Group’s offer for ASA Resource Group plc, announced on 12 July 
2017, both cited in Practical Law for Companies, Public M&A: Trends and 
Highlights 2017 (2018). 
73 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) (“UK Code”) rule 13.4; 
the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) Practice 
Note 15. Associated prohibitions are also placed on conditions relating to the 
working capital of the enlarged group: UK Code, Practice Statement 11 of 2005 
(Working Capital Requirements in Cash and Securities Exchange Offers); Practice 
Statement 10 of 2005 (Cash Offers Financed by the Issue of Offeror Securities). 
There is some relaxation for financing preconditions (as opposed to financing 
conditions): see rule 13.4 of the UK Code. 
74 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) (UK) rule 13.1; the 
Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) rule 30.1. 
75 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) (UK) rule 13.1; the 
Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) rule 30.1. See 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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or bespoke conditions in a wider range of circumstances so long as they 
are objective in nature and do not depend on the judgment of the 
bidder.76 Third, any decision to waive the condition to lapse the offer or 
terminate the transaction must require the consent of the takeover 
panel.77 
36 However, what if the takeover panel and the court differ on 
whether the target may invoke the condition to terminate the offer? This 
may arise if the panel and the court take into account different factors in 
arriving at the decision. This is illustrated with bespoke or negotiated 
conditions. As a matter of contract law, the non-fulfilment of a bespoke 
or negotiated condition (for example, the consolidated net asset value of 
the company and its subsidiaries not being less than $100m) will 
ordinarily be a sufficient ground in itself to lapse the offer, unless the 
reduction in the net asset value is de minimis. However, the takeover 
codes in all of the three jurisdictions require that the circumstances 
giving rise to the right to lapse the offer must be material in the context 
of the offer.78 
37 In a prior work, it has been argued that the risk of inconsistency 
between the applications of the provisions relating to bespoke 
conditions by the court (adjudicating on contract law) and by the 
takeover panel is very real.79 While the most recent high-profile 
invocation of the condition in the UK was that in WPP Group plc – 
Tempus Group plc,80 the situation has also arisen in Singapore, 
                                                                                                                               
UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Consultation Paper: Offeree Protection 
Conditions (PCP 15, 21 July 2003). 
76 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) rule 15.1. 
77 See n 70 above. 
78 In the UK, Practice Statement No 5: Rule 13.5(a) – Invocation of Conditions 
(28 April 2004; amended 19 September 2011) at p 2 provides that: 
… [i]n considering whether a particular matter should give rise to the right to 
invoke a condition, it is the Executive’s practice to take into account all 
relevant factors, including whether: 
• the condition was the subject of negotiation with the offeree company; 
• the condition was expressly drawn to offeree company shareholders’ 
attention in the offer document or announcement, with a clear 
explanation of the circumstances which might give rise to the right to 
invoke it; and 
• the condition was included to take account of the particular 
circumstances of the offeree company. 
 See rule 15.1, note 2 of Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 
24 January 2019) and rule 30.1, note 2 of the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and 
Share Buy-backs (July 2018). 
79 See Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in Comparative 
Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee 
Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 13. 
80 PS 2001/15 (6 November 2001). Cf Hailiang’s offer for ASA Resource Group 
(“ASA”) dated 12 July 2017 (UK), where there is an express insolvency condition 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Hong Kong and Australia, for example, in the Singapore case where 
Banta attempted to acquire Mentor Media and there was a specific 
bespoke condition precedent in the agreement that the net tangible asset 
value of the target should not fall below a specified amount. Banta 
argued that the condition was not met. However, the SIC ruled that 
Banta could not withdraw the offer, and Banta proceeded to sue Mentor 
Media in the High Court for a declaration that the termination of the 
agreement was valid. The matter was settled without proceeding to 
judgment.81 
38 The ruling of the SIC also has a similar parallel to that of the 
HK Panel in China Gas’s offer for Zhongyu Gas in 2010.82 China Gas, 
through a wholly owned subsidiary, made an offer for Zhongyu Gas, and 
the major shareholders, holding approximately 48% of the shares, gave 
irrevocable undertakings to accept the offer. The offers were conditional 
upon, among other things, Zhongyu Gas shares remaining listed and 
traded on the stock exchange, save for any temporary suspension as a 
result of the offers and no indication being received from the Securities 
and Futures Commission and/or stock exchange that the listing of the 
shares was or was likely to be withdrawn. 
                                                                                                                               
relating to the target and companies within its group: London Stock Exchange, 
“Cash Offer for ASA Resource Group plc” (RNS No 8119K) (12 July 2017) 
https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-
news-detail/other/13291794.html (accessed 28 February 2019). After the offer was 
announced, ASA announced that it was “struggling to meet its ongoing liabilities” 
(London Stock Exchange, “ASA Resource Group plc: Suspension of Shares and 
Posting of Offer Document” (RNS No 4376M) (28 July 2017)) and on 16 August 
2017, the bidder announced that the Takeover Panel Executive confirmed its 
ability to lapse the offer on the insolvency condition: London Stock Exchange, 
“Response to Appointment of Administrators by ASA Board: Extension of Offer” 
(RNS No 1263O) (16 August 2017). Ultimately, the bidder did not invoke the 
insolvency condition: London Stock Exchange, “Offer Unconditional in All 
Aspects” (RNS No 1447X) (21 November 2017). The announcements are found in: 
https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-
detail/ASA/13311404.html; https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/
market-news/market-news-detail/other/13331279.html; and https://asaresource
group.com/media-centre/regulatory-news/offer-unconditional-in-all-aspects 
(accessed 28 February 2019). 
81 See Wai Yee Wan, “UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore” in Comparative 
Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee 
Wan eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2017) ch 13. 
82 Hong Kong, Takeovers and Mergers Panel, Panel Decision: In relation to the review 
by the Takeovers and Mergers Panel of the Executive’s ruling that it was not 
prepared to confirm that Rich Legend International Limited, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of China Gas Holdings Limited (“China Gas”) may invoke certain 
conditions in respect of the conditional voluntary general offers for all the 
outstanding shares, convertible bonds, and share options of Zhongyu Gas Holdings 
Limited under Note 2 to Rule 30.1 of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers and 
accordingly the Offeror should proceed with its Offers (24 May 2010). 
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39 Shortly after the announcement of the offers, the senior 
managers of Zhongyu Gas, particularly those in some of its Chinese 
subsidiaries, were unhappy with the offers and made demands to 
improve their position. W, one of the major shareholders who provided 
the irrevocable undertaking to accept the offer and who was also the 
chairman of Zhongyu Gas, acceded to the requests by giving them 
ex gratia bonuses and cars. However, the senior managers made further 
demands which were refused by W. Subsequently, the senior managers 
retaliated by refusing assistance to Zhongyu Gas’s auditors, with the 
result being the suspension of the audit. When Zhongyu Gas failed to 
publish its audited financial statements for the year ending 31 December 
2009 within the time frame required by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
listing rules, trading in the shares of Zhongyu Gas was suspended. 
40 China Gas applied to the HK Panel to withdraw the offer. 
W consented to the withdrawal. Under the HK Code,83 which provisions 
then were similar to those in the UK and Singapore, any announced 
offer can only be withdrawn in a limited set of circumstances and then 
only with the consent of the HK Panel.84 Consent was refused by the 
Takeover Executive and the HK Panel upheld the decision on 13 May 
2010.85 The HK Panel upheld an underlying principle to create 
conditions of the “greatest certainty practicable in the context of a 
takeover offer”.86 In this case, while Zhongyu Gas was in breach of the 
listing rules because it failed to publish its audited annual financial 
                                                          
83 The relevant provision is note 2 to rule 30.1 of the Codes on Takeovers and 
Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018), which provides that an offeror should 
not invoke any condition, other than the acceptance condition, so as to cause the 
offer to lapse unless the circumstances which give rise to the right to invoke the 
condition are of material significance to the offeror in the context of the offer. 
84 The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) was 
recently amended in July 2018 to prohibit conditions that are dependent on the 
judgment by the target company. 
85 See Takeovers and Mergers Panel, Panel Decision: In relation to the review by the 
Takeovers and Mergers Panel of the Executive’s ruling that it was not prepared to 
confirm that Rich Legend International Limited (“Offeror”), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of China Gas Holdings Limited, may invoke certain conditions in respect 
of the conditional voluntary general offers for all of the outstanding shares, 
convertible bonds and share options of Zhongyu Gas Holdings Limited under note 2 
to rule 30.1 of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers and accordingly the Offeror 
should proceed with its offers (24 May 2010). The decision was announced on 
13 May 2010, and the written grounds were dated 24 May 2010. 
86 Takeovers and Mergers Panel, Panel Decision: In relation to the review by the 
Takeovers and Mergers Panel of the Executive’s ruling that it was not prepared to 
confirm that Rich Legend International Limited (“Offeror”), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of China Gas Holdings Limited, may invoke certain conditions in respect 
of the conditional voluntary general offers for all of the outstanding shares, 
convertible bonds and share options of Zhongyu Gas Holdings Limited under note 2 
to rule 30.1 of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers and accordingly the Offeror 
should proceed with its offers (24 May 2010) at [21]. 
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statements in the prescribed period, the HK Panel found that this was a 
matter which was capable of being rectified, and there was no indication 
that the listing was under threat and no action, apart from suspension, 
had been taken against it. Thus, China Gas failed to demonstrate that 
the listing was likely to be withdrawn permanently or that the 
suspension was of material significance in the context of the offer. 
41 From a contract law perspective, the result may appear 
surprising. The offers expressly provide that the offers were conditional 
upon listing of Zhongyu Gas, save for a temporary suspension. Given 
that the shares had been suspended since March 2010 and remained 
suspended by the time of the hearing of the HK Panel in May 2010, and 
there was no certainty as to whether the senior managers would 
co-operate with the auditors to provide the requisite information for the 
audit to be completed and for the suspension lifted, it would appear 
harsh to compel China Gas to proceed with the offers. Further, it 
appeared that the board of Zhongyu Gas had ceased to have control of 
its major subsidiaries. According to the HK Panel, there was no risk of 
an immediate delisting of Zhongyu Gas because a company would 
normally delist only after a period of 18 months from the time that the 
securities exchange indicate that a delisting is likely. The message 
appeared to be that the existing board of Zhongyu Gas had not done 
enough and it was for the new board (if the takeover succeeded) to make 
further efforts to either get the senior managers to co-operate or remove 
them. 87 
42 In Australia, there are also parallel developments relating to the 
conflict between the parties’ intentions and the takeover regulator’s 
interests. In 2010, in NGM Resources Ltd,88 Paladin Energy (“Paladin”) 
announced a recommended bid for NGM Resources Ltd (“NGM”), 
where the bid was subject to a force majeure condition that no: 
… terrorism … or other event beyond the control of NGM or the 
relevant subsidiary occurs which affects or is likely to affect the assets, 
liabilities, financial position, performance, profitability or prospects of 
NGM or any of its subsidiaries. 
In September 2010, seven employees of a French uranium company 
were abducted by terrorist forces in Niger. The town where the 
abductions occurred was some 150km from NGM’s tenements and 
240km from the closest town to NGM’s tenements. Paladin sought to 
                                                          
87 Eventually, the board of Zhongyu Gas received the requisite confirmation that the 
senior managers of Zhongyu Gas would co-operate with the audit on 18 May 2010, 
and the audited financial statements were announced on 24 June 2010. See 
Zhongyu Gas Holdings Limited, Result Announcement for the Year Ended 
31 December 2009 (24 June 2010). 
88 [2010] ATP 11. 
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invoke the force majeure condition, on the ground that the costs acts of 
terrorism are likely to affect to the assets, performance or prospects of 
NGM. 
43 The Australian Panel denied that NGM could invoke the 
force majeure condition as NGM could not demonstrate that the events 
will “materially” affect its assets, performance or prospects. It has been 
argued by commentators that this effectively rewrote the contract 
between NGM and Paladin, which did not have a materiality 
qualification.89 The Australian Panel explained that it implied the 
materiality qualification to the condition because of the general policy 
of certainty found in chapter 6 of the Corporations Act. 
44 Thus, the effect of the above cases is that even when parties to 
the transaction have reached a commercial, negotiated agreement on 
what they consider to be material, break-away thresholds of the 
transaction, the agreement may be overridden by the takeover regulator. 
As argued in a previous work, the reasons are founded on market 
certainty and orderly conduct, and that takeovers which have been 
announced should be completed unless they fail for regulatory reasons 
or fail to garner the requisite acceptances.90 
45 The problem is compounded by the fact that even if the court 
gives effect to the express terms of the contract, the bidder may 
nevertheless not receive any judicial remedy. If the bidder brings an 
action for a declaration that it is entitled to terminate the offer, the court 
may take the view that, irrespective of the bidder’s legal position, the 
court still should not generally intervene in an ongoing takeover. 
Following ex parte Datafin, the courts will defer to the regulatory 
primacy of the takeover codes and the takeover panels, and will not 
suspend the bidder’s obligations to complete the transaction in 
accordance with the timetable under the takeover codes. In such a case, 
                                                          
89 Tony Damian & Andrew Rich, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks: The Use 
of Schemes of Arrangement to Effect Change of Control Transactions (Sydney: Ross 
Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Taxation Law Monograph Series, 
3rd Ed, 2013). 
90 See Wai Yee Wan, “Invoking Protective Conditions to Terminate Public Mergers 
and Acquisitions Transactions” [2011] JBL 64. The principles are also affirmed in 
connection with the appeal of the ruling in respect of whether the offeror, CGNPC-
URC, could reduce the offer price of Kalahari shares after it has made an indicative 
offer; the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (12th Ed, 2016) allows the 
reduction only in “wholly exceptional” circumstances, and the UK Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers ruled that integrity of the market requires there to be 
certainty and orderly conduct, which prevail over the apparent advantages in 
allowing the price reduction, even if the target board consents to such reduction: 
see Kalahari Minerals plc (Reasons for the Hearings Committee’s decision) 
PS 2011/11 (25 May 2011). 
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while the bidder is not precluded from commencing litigation (as the 
no-frustration principle applies only to the target board), it is still bound 
to complete the transaction in accordance with such timetable. Thus, 
even if the matter is ultimately heard at trial and the court reaches a 
different substantive decision from the takeover panel, it will be too 
challenging for the bidder to restrain the acquisition. In such a case, any 
successful lawsuit by the bidder would be moot, and it would not derive 
any practical gain from it. The injunctive relief is in fact the real remedy 
sought by the bidder, such that the judicial failure to intervene would 
have substantive consequences, thus depriving the bidder of any real 
relief. 
IV. Remedial orders of the takeover panels and the courts 
46 Although the takeover panel is not tasked with considering the 
legal position of the parties to the takeover, the panel’s remedial order or 
failure to grant relief in respect of contravention of the takeover code 
will often affect the participants’ remedies at private law. The following 
provides illustrative examples. 
47 First, in the Singapore Jade Technologies case, the bidder made a 
voluntary cash offer and despatched the offer document. However, the 
bidder was not able to complete the offer because it did not have 
sufficient resources to do so; its controlling shareholder deceived the 
financial adviser to give a cash confirmation. The bidder and its 
controlling shareholder were in clear breach of the Singapore Code for 
failing to take reasonable steps to be satisfied that the offer could be 
implemented in full.91 The bidder applied to the SIC to withdraw the 
offer. The SIC allowed the bidder to withdraw the offer prior to the 
expiry of the offer period, and no relief was granted to the accepting 
shareholders or shareholders who have not yet accepted the offer, 
though this point was not expressly argued before the hearing 
committee. 
48 As a matter of contract law, shareholders who have accepted the 
offer prior to the withdrawal should ordinarily be able to bring an 
action, in the courts, against the bidder on the grounds that they have a 
binding contract which was breached, and could theoretically demand 
compensation, being the difference between the offer price and the 
market value of their shares (when the offer was withdrawn), from the 
bidder. However, shareholders who have not yet accepted the offer prior 
                                                          
91 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) (“Singapore 
Code”) General Principle 6. This should not ordinarily occur because the financial 
adviser has to confirm the availability of resources under rules 3.5 and 23.8 of the 
Singapore Code. 
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to the withdrawal would not have a contractual claim for compensation 
against the bidder since no contract would have been formed before the 
bidder withdrew the offer. As a matter of principle, it is by no means 
self-evident why such shareholders (who thought that they had until the 
date of expiry of the stated offer period to accept the offer) should not 
be entitled to any kind of relief from the bidder who breached General 
Principle 6 or rule 3.5; while the Singapore Code provides for specific 
cases where compensation is allowed, these are by no means exhaustive, 
and compensation may be possible in a wider set of circumstances.92 
49 Second, in Irish Distillers Group plc,93 discussed above, one of 
the institutional shareholders which gave the irrevocable undertaking to 
Pernod to accept the offer had commenced litigation in the Irish High 
Court on the basis that that it (the institutional shareholder) was not 
bound by the acceptance in question. The Irish High Court ruled that 
the undertaking (and the acceptance) were binding.94 Subsequently, the 
UK Panel determined that Pernod had breached the UK Code in 
obtaining irrevocable undertakings from the shareholders of Irish 
Distillers to accept the offer because Pernod failed to provide adequate 
information. However, notwithstanding the breach, the UK Panel 
refused to grant relief to the accepting shareholders, including the 
institutional shareholders, from the obligation to tender the shares in 
accordance with the irrevocable undertaking. Had the UK Panel granted 
such relief, these shareholders could have been relieved from their 
irrevocable undertaking and could have accepted the rival bidder’s 
higher offer afterwards. 
50 This is not strictly a case of potential inconsistency between the 
decisions of the UK Panel and the Irish court since the subject matter of 
contention before the two adjudicating bodies had been different; the 
former was whether there had been a contravention of the takeover code 
and the latter was whether the irrevocable undertaking was binding as a 
matter of contract law. However, the failure by the UK Panel to grant 
relief meant that the wrongdoer could “escape with the profits of its 
wrongdoing”.95 
51 Third, in respect of disclosure failures in takeovers (that could 
not be rectified in time), compensation orders that may be made by a 
takeover panel to remedy the contravention are generally more 
attractive than the judicial remedies under general law. Under general 
                                                          
92 See para 11 above. 
93 PS 1988/25 (17 November 1988). See para 14 above. 
94 Pernod Ricard Comrie plc v FII (Fyffes) plc (1988) LEXIS Transcript No 8388p. 
95 See Tony Shea, “Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom” (1990) 
16 Brooklyn J In’tl L 89 at 106. 
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law, the claimant has to show that the statements were made to the 
recipients and the recipients had relied on the statement. 
52 The examples from UK illustrate this point. In UK, in Service 
Corp International – Great Southern Group – Loewen Group Inc,96 the 
bidder made a no-increase statement but, as a result of an oversight, did 
not reserve the right to increase the bid should a competitive bid arise. 
The UK Panel accepted that it was a genuine mistake and allowed the 
bidder to increase its offer. The UK Panel was influenced by the bidder’s 
decision to compensate shareholders who had sold their shares in the 
market after being misled by the press release.97 This was an example of 
the UK Panel exercising its power to grant dispensation provided that 
shareholders were not prejudiced, which indirectly led to compensation 
being paid to the shareholders. 
53 If similar matters had arisen in Singapore, breach of disclosure 
obligations by the bidder could result in compensation to the recipient 
shareholders in the law of tort (pursuant to misrepresentation) but only 
where the misrepresentation related to a fact (instead of the bidder’s 
intention), and then only if the recipients had relied on said 
misrepresentation. There is the possibility of recovering statutory 
compensation under the Securities and Futures Act, but such 
compensation would be subject to a specified ceiling unless the claimant 
proves that he had relied on the misrepresentation.98 
V. Implications and analysis 
54 The author’s analysis in the preceding sections raises the 
following issues. First, if the matters are effectively disposed at 
proceedings before the takeover panel, while tactical litigation is 
reduced, it raises the question of whether the takeover framework is 
intended to make the takeover panel the main (or even only) forum for 
resolving disputes during the bid. In other words, is it desirable to 
effectively foreclose the right of the market participants to bring actions 
ex post takeovers? Second, if it is not desired to foreclose the right of 
market participants to bring actions, how can the right of such parties 
                                                          
96 PS 1994/8 (10 August 1994). 
97 Cf CALA plc – Dotterel Ltd – Miller 1999 plc PS 1999/8 (28 May 1999), where the 
UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers refused to allow the bidder to increase the 
offer, holding that it was bound by the “no-increase statement”. 
98 See generally ss 234 and 236 of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 
2006 Rev Ed) and discussion in Wai Yee Wan, “Enforcement of the Takeover Code 
and Market Misconduct in the Course of Takeovers” in Wai Yee Wan & 
Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law and Practice 
(Singapore: LexisNexis, 2013) at paras 16.113–16.115. 
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be preserved without undermining the objectives of ensuring that 
disputes are resolved quickly and conclusively without undue disruption 
to the market? This article considers the suitability of importing the 
partial solution in Australia in the form of s 659B of the Corporations 
Act 2001, which makes the Australian Panel the only forum for solving 
disputes when the bid is under way. 
A. Making the takeover panels the de facto forum for resolving 
takeover disputes? 
55 Due to the time-sensitive nature of a takeover, there are several 
documented advantages in a model of takeover regulation that reaches 
decisions speedily and conclusively.99 Further, in certain matters 
involving determination of concert party relations (such as that in 
Guinness’s takeover of Distillers in late 1980s),100 a specialist takeover 
panel is better placed than the court to make such determination. 
Certainly, tactical litigation, with the intention of frustrating or 
hampering a bona fide unwelcome bid, is usually motivated by 
management self-interest in entrenchment and is rarely beneficial to the 
market for corporate control. 
56 However, the question that arises is whether all litigation in 
general, and not merely tactical litigation that hampers or frustrates a 
bid, is undesirable under takeover conditions. This is a real issue; due to 
the high financial stakes involved, the real remedy that the bidder board 
seeks is a declaratory relief in the court so as to avoid the obligation to 
complete the offer if the events occur such that it is no longer 
commercially viable to proceed (see, for example, the cases involving 
Mentor Media and Zhongyu Gas, outlined above). However, takeover 
panels are also concerned with ensuring certainty and predictability in 
the markets. The implicit view is that takeover offers, once announced, 
should always be completed and may only fail for regulatory reasons or 
failure to receive sufficient acceptances. This is regarded as sufficiently 
important to override the parties’ carefully negotiated bespoke 
conditions. 
57 It could be argued that there are good reasons for takeover 
panels to be de facto forums for resolving disputes. Takeover panels, 
whose panel members are drawn from the investment and finance 
                                                          
99 See generally John Armour & David Skeel, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers and Why? The Peculiar Diverge of US and UK Takeover Regulation” 
(2007) 95 Geo LJ 1727; John Coffee, Jr, “Regulating the Market for Corporate 
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate 
Governance” (1984) 84(5) Colum L Rev 1251. 
100 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
communities, will have the necessary expertise and are well placed to 
make such decisions. The takeover codes are statements of what is 
regarded as good commercial practice, and the takeover panels generally 
consult with market players before effecting changes.101 In contrast, the 
courts are not able to do so and can only make their decision based on 
the case brought forward by the parties. In Australia, prior to the 
amendments to the Corporations Act 2001, scholars have criticised the 
court in the Glencore International AG v Takeover Panel102 for reaching a 
decision, on whether a cash-settled equity swap amounts to an interest 
in the share and are therefore disclosable under the substantial 
shareholding requirements under company law, based on strict legal 
principles that are different from the takeover regulator, whose decisions 
were based more on common sense and in line with commercial 
reality.103 
58 However, the policy reasons behind the drastic measure to deny 
the parties the ability to seek effective relief in the courts are not 
persuasive. In particular, outside of the narrow situation involving 
tactical litigation to enjoin hostile bids, this article argues that the policy 
arguments do not apply with the same force to other areas such as bidder 
directors’ duties and enforcing contractual rights. It should be noted 
that allowing the parties to litigate their rights in the court does not 
always mean that the matter would proceed to trial for the result as 
disputes are frequently settled before the final hearing or judgment. 
However, a party’s negotiating position will be considerably weakened 
(and consequently its private rights diminished) if it is not even able to 
obtain an effective remedy in the court. Further, the jurisprudence on 
fiduciary duties will be weakened if the matters are decided solely before 
takeover panels, which will prioritise market certainty and orderliness. 
B. The case for clearer delineation of the powers and jurisdiction 
of the takeover panel and the courts? 
59 Having argued in the preceding section that the policy reasons 
to enjoin litigation in takeover disputes and to require them to be 
resolved solely before the takeover panels are not strong, the remaining 
question is what should be done. This problem is exacerbated by the 
                                                          
101 Eg, David Kershaw, Principles of Takeover Regulation (Oxford University Press, 
2016). For Singapore and Hong Kong, the consultation papers issued by the 
Securities Industry Council and Hong Kong Takeovers and Mergers Panel are 
found in http://www.mas.gov.sg/sic and https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/regulatory-
functions/listings-and-takeovers/takeovers-and-mergers/ (accessed November 
2018) respectively. 
102 (2006) 56 ACSR 753. 
103 See Geoffrey Morse, “Regulating Takeovers: The Regulators and the Courts – Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?” (2007) 22 NZULR 622. 
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wide-ranging remedial orders of takeover panels. For example, even the 
primary securities regulator in Singapore, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (“MAS”), has no jurisdiction to grant compensation orders in 
the way that the SIC has, nor does it have jurisdiction to apply to the 
court for orders to compensate people affected by contravention of the 
market misconduct provisions of the Securities and Futures Act. Instead, 
persons affected by market misconduct will have to apply to court 
themselves to seek civil compensation orders against the persons who 
have contravened the Securities and Futures Act.104 In practice, there are 
significant obstacles to the recovery of such civil compensation by 
investors, which are documented elsewhere, including collective action 
problems and the statutory caps on recovery in certain cases.105 In 
contrast, under the Singapore Code regime, the SIC carries out the 
investigation and makes remedial orders, which may include ordering 
the parties to compensate the losses likely incurred by the investors. As 
such, an investor is treated more favourably under the Singapore Code 
and is likely to favour this route. 
60 In theory, the takeover panel will not deal with questions of 
private law, such as whether a party is in breach of contract or any other 
obligation imposed under general law. The takeover panel should also 
not deal with cases involving minority shareholder oppression, which is 
a matter of company law. However, there is much potential for 
overlapping jurisdictions between the takeover regulator and the courts 
in regulating takeover offers. As set out in above,106 the takeover panels 
have expanded their jurisdiction and have intervened in matters which 
will affect the obligations of the boards of bidders to their companies 
and/or shareholders, and which are not confined to the no-frustration 
rule. In the interests of promoting certainty and predictability, they have 
sought to intervene in matters which may potentially conflict with the 
parties’ contractual obligations and duties under the company law. It is 
shown above107 that, while the remedial aims of the takeover regulator 
and the courts are theoretically different, the availability of relief (or lack 
thereof) will have substantive implications for the parties in their private 
law claims. 
61 Further, there are residual provisions in the takeover codes that 
relate to the conduct of boards and the shareholders as a whole. 
For example, the Singapore and HK codes each contains a general 
                                                          
104 Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) ss 234 and 236. 
105 See discussion in Wai Yee Wan, “Enforcement of the Takeover Code and Market 
Misconduct in the Course of Takeovers” in Wai Yee Wan & Umakanth Varottil, 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law and Practice (Singapore: LexisNexis, 
2013) ch 16. 
106 See paras 26–45 above. 
107 See paras 46–53 above. 
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principle, which is no longer found in the UK Code, that “rights of 
control must be exercised in good faith and oppression of minority is 
wholly unacceptable”.108 The question is therefore whether the SIC or the 
HK Panel may, in the future, purport to assert jurisdiction over 
shareholder protection issues and thereby pre-empt the courts’ 
determination. Currently, this does not appear likely since none of the 
detailed rules in the Singapore Code or HK Code have been tied to this 
principle of unacceptable minority oppression. However, this lack of 
certainty in the jurisdictional framework is undesirable. 
62 It is submitted that there needs to be careful consideration as to 
which body should resolve substantive disputes in takeovers in the case 
of overlapping jurisdictions. While it is desirable to proceed in a manner 
that continues to allow, for the most part, speedy and conclusive 
decisions without undermining market certainty, this article argues that 
the outcome has to be one that will not effectively foreclose a market 
participant’s right to seek legal recourse. It acknowledges that some 
disputes are better left exclusively to the purview of takeover panels. 
For example, for disputes concerning the procedural aspects of 
takeovers, such as the provision of adequate and non-misleading 
disclosures by boards of targets and bidders, the starting point is that 
they are much better dealt with by the takeover panels. The remedy for 
inadequate disclosures is typically compelling the offending party to 
correct the takeover disclosures and/or to extend time to allow the 
shareholders to consider the new information.109 In the UK, breach of 
disclosure obligations under the UK Code is explicitly stated not to be a 
basis for applying for private law action.110 
63 Where the dispute resolution relates to substantive terms of 
agreements entered into by the parties to the bid or shareholders, the 
author turns to a jurisdiction which has explicitly considered this point. 
In Australia, the solution is found in ss 659B(1) and 659C of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. Section 659B(1) prohibits the 
commencement of proceedings in “relation to a takeover bid or 
proposed takeover bid, before the end of the bid period”, unless the 
proceedings are brought by the Australian Securities and Investment 
                                                          
108 Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (revised 24 January 2019) General 
Principle 4; The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs (July 2018) 
(Hong Kong) General Principle 7. 
109 For a discussion on disputes relating to disclosures of information in the 
Australian context, see Ian Ramsay, “Takeover Dispute Resolution in Australia and 
the United States – Takeovers Panel or Courts” (2015) 33 C&SLJ 341. 
110 Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) s 956. See also David Kershaw, “The Illusion of 
Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition (2007) 
56 ICLQ 267. 
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Commission, a minister or government authority.111 When the 
application is made to the court after the bid period is over, even where 
the panel declines to make a finding of unacceptable circumstances 
(and the court subsequently finds that the behaviour of the participant 
contravenes the Corporations Act), there are limited powers of the court 
to impose remedies.112 When the court is hearing the dispute, the panel 
generally will not intervene.113 Thus, primacy is given to takeover 
regulators by prohibiting the market participants’ bringing of court 
proceedings while the bid is in force and limiting the powers of the 
court post-bid. In contrast, due to Australian constitutional law, judicial 
review proceedings challenging the Australian Panel decision can be 
brought at any time during the bid (and not only after the bid).114 
64 The practical operation of the provisions, however, is not so 
straightforward. The Australian courts have construed s 659B narrowly; 
in Lionsgate Australia v Macquarie Private Portfolio Management,115 
where the court considered the issue of whether a bidder may seek 
specific performance of a substantial shareholder’s contractual promise 
to sell into the bid prior to the expiry of the bid period, Austin J took a 
very restrictive reading of the provision, holding that the provision does 
not prevent enforcement of a contractual right as opposed to an action 
taken as part of, or for the purposes of, the bid.116 
65 The converse of non-interference by takeover panels of court 
orders is also true in Australia; Australian takeover jurisprudence 
establishes that a remedial order made by the takeover panel for breach 
of the takeover code is not intended to affect the existing legal rights of 
the parties. In Rinker Group Ltd,117 it was held that:118 
                                                          
111 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 659B. In the case of the scheme of arrangement, 
while the Australian Takeover Panel (“Australian Panel”) has powers to declare 
unacceptable circumstances under s 657A(2)(a) of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001, the Australian Panel will generally not intervene: see Australian 
Government, Takeovers Panel, Guidance Note 1 – Unacceptable Circumstances 
at para 18. See Robert P Austin, “The Courts and the Panel” in The Takeovers 
Panel after 10 Years (Jennifer Hill & Robert P Austin eds) Session 5. See also Ian 
Ramsay, “Takeover Dispute Resolution in Australia and the United States – 
Takeovers Panel or Courts” (2015) 33 C&SLJ 341. 
112 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 659C. 
113 Re Taipan Resources NL (No 2) (2000) 36 ACSR 704 at 709–710. I am indebted to 
Dr Emma Armson for drawing the decision to my attention. 
114 Australian Constitution s 75(v). See Ian Ramsay, “Takeover Dispute Resolution in 
Australia and the United States – Takeovers Panel or Courts” (2015) 
33 C&SLJ 341. 
115 [2007] NSWSC 318. 
116 See Rodd Levy, Takeovers Law and Strategy (Thomson Reuters, 4th Ed, 2012) 
ch 21. 
117 [2007] ATP 17; [2007] ATP 19. 
118 Rinker Group Ltd [2007] ATP 19 at [123]–[124]. 
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The Panel’s orders are not intended to ‘compensate’ as a court might 
do at law. Rather, in this case, they are appropriate to protect the rights 
or interests of affected persons, noting that it is not feasible to ‘restore 
any disadvantaged parties to the position they would have been in had 
the unacceptable circumstances not occurred’: Guidance Note 4 
at [4.13]. Possible orders available on, say, 8 May, included a payment 
order to sellers, holding CEMEX to its best and final statement, or 
returning to sellers an equivalent number of shares (each possibility 
assuming there would be no unfair prejudice) … 
The review Panel disagrees with CEMEX that the concept of new 
rights is no different in form or substance to rights enforced by a 
court. The Panel is directed by section 657A(3) to have regard to 
(among other things) the policy of the takeovers chapter as set out in 
section 602 when exercising its powers, including its order powers. 
This goes beyond what a court would consider. Also, any order can 
only be made if the Panel makes a declaration as the foundation. 
A declaration takes into account policy and other considerations. The 
review Panel therefore considers that its orders create new rights. 
Moreover, orders the Panel may make in appropriate circumstances 
can extend to orders so that a takeover proceeds as it would have if the 
unacceptable circumstances had not occurred. Although not ordered 
in this case, such an order does not necessarily align with enforcing or 
adjudicating pre-existing rights either. Lastly, the Panel notes that 
orders can protect rights or interests of persons not parties to the 
application. 
66 Thus, while Australian position purports to delineate the 
jurisdictions of the panel and the courts by the timing in which the 
actions are brought (whether during or post-bid), there remains some 
areas of ambiguities: for example, during the life of a bid, a party may 
still bring enforcement actions in the court for orders that do not relate 
to the bid. The difficulty is that the line between the two is not clear; the 
effect of a court order to take certain actions or to forestall certain 
actions may impact the outcome of the bid, even if it is not the action 
that directly advances or frustrates the bid. Likewise, this article has 
demonstrated that orders made by takeover panels can have substantive 
impact on the legal rights of the parties. This problem is compounded 
by the fact that panels and courts may have different views on the 
resolution of the disputes as they are motivated by different factors. 
67 In view of these difficulties, it is argued that the delineation of 
the jurisdictions cannot be solely determined on whether the actions are 
brought during or after the bid. Instead, in an action brought by the 
party to the bid or a market participant, the decision by either the panel 
or court to make an order (or not to make an order) should centre on 
whether the effect of making an order will effectively foreclose the 
party’s remedies pursuant to the other dispute resolution body. 
Undertakings may be required by the party making the application to 
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ensure that the parties’ rights are preserved. It is important to appreciate 
the challenges that the order made by the court or panel can affect the 
outcome of the remedy sought by the party in the other dispute 
resolution body. 
VI. Conclusion 
68 Takeover bids take place against the background of substantive 
private law obligations that the participants of the takeover bid 
(including the shareholders, boards, bidder and target) are subject to. 
Takeover regulators are specifically entrusted with the regulation of 
public takeovers, and there are many documented advantages in having 
specialist bodies which have the commercial and securities market 
expertise to determine disputes speedily and with certainty. This is 
beneficial not only for the parties but also for the investors. The 
traditional role of the courts has been to defer to the decisions of the 
takeover regulator and to intervene only in exceptional cases. 
69 However, the more recent developments show that the takeover 
regulators have prioritised certainty and predictability in the market and 
in so doing, taken a more expansive view of their roles and jurisdictions, 
apart from regulating the processes and the enforcement of the 
no-frustration rule. In so doing, there will be an increase in conflicts 
that arise between the takeover codes and the substantive private law 
governing the relationships among the participants. The remedies that 
are ordered by the takeover panel will also have an impact on the 
substantive obligations of the parties. This article has sought to 
demonstrate that there needs to be more robust debate on the correct 
balance as to the proper role of the regulator and the courts in this area. 
Australia has tried to reach the balance by disallowing private market 
participants to mount court challenges during the life of the bid. As 
shown in this article, this approach is not without difficulties. The better 
approach is for the panel or the court to appreciate that the orders that 
they make will affect the parties’ ability to seek remedies in the other 
takeover dispute resolution body. 
 
